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Abstract
In private-value auction environments, Chung and Ely (2007) es-
tablish maxmin and Bayesian foundations for dominant-strategy mech-
anisms. We first show that similar foundation results for ex post mech-
anisms hold true even with interdependent values if the interdepen-
dence is only cardinal. This includes, for example, the one-dimensional
environments of Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Bergemann and
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Morris (2009b). Conversely, if the environment exhibits ordinal inter-
dependence, which is typically the case with multi-dimensional envi-
ronments (e.g., a player’s private information comprises a noisy sig-
nal of the common value of the auctioned good and an idiosyncratic
private-value parameter), then in general, ex post mechanisms do not
have foundation. That is, there exists a non-ex-post mechanism that
achieves strictly higher expected revenue than the optimal ex post
mechanism, regardless of the agents’ high-order beliefs.
1 Introduction
The recent literature on mechanism design provides a series of studies on the
robustness of mechanisms, motivated by the idea that a desirable mechanism
should not rely too heavily on the agents’ common knowledge structure.1 One
approach taken in the literature is to adopt stronger solution concepts that
are insensitive to various common knowledge assumptions. For instance, in
private-value environments, Segal (2003) studies dominant-strategy incentive
compatible sales mechanisms. In interdependent-value environments, Das-
gupta and Maskin (2000) study efficient auction rules that are independent
of the details under the concept of ex post incentive compatibility.
However, a mechanism that achieves desired outcomes without the agents’
common knowledge assumption does not immediately imply dominant-strategy
or ex post incentive compatibility. In revenue maximization in private-value
1See, for example, Wilson (1985).
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auction (under “regularity” conditions), Chung and Ely (2007) fill in this
gap by establishing the maxmin and Bayesian foundation of the optimal
dominant-strategy mechanism, in the following sense. Consider a situation
where the seller in an auction (principal) only knows a joint distribution of
the bidders’ (agents) valuation profile for the auctioned object, which may be
based on data about similar auctions in the past. On the other hand, he does
not have reliable information about the bidders’ beliefs about each other’s
value. For example, the bidders may have more or less information than
the seller (e.g., through their information acquisition), or may simply have a
“wrong” belief from the seller’s point of view for various reasons. Thus, the
seller’s objective is to find a mechanism that achieves a good amount of rev-
enue regardless of the bidders’ (high-order) beliefs. Note that, in a dominant-
strategy mechanism, it is always an equilibrium for each bidder to report his
true value, and therefore, it always guarantees the same level of expected rev-
enue. On the other hand, in non-dominant-strategy mechanisms, expected
revenue may vary with the bidders’ (high-order) beliefs. In the definition
of Chung and Ely (2007), there is a maxmin foundation for a dominant-
strategy mechanism if, for any non-dominant-strategy mechanism, there is
a possible belief of the seller with which the dominant-strategy mechanism
achieves (weakly) higher expected revenue than the non-dominant-strategy
mechanism.2
2As a stronger concept, if the same belief can be found for any non-dominant-strategy
mechanism with which a dominant-strategy mechanism achieves (weakly) higher expected
revenue, then there is a Bayesian foundation, because, as long as the seller is Bayesian
rational and has that particular belief, he finds it optimal to offer a dominant-strategy
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In this paper, we examine the existence of such foundations for ex post
incentive compatible mechanisms in interdependent-value environments. Our
main observation is that the key property that guarantees such foundations
is what we call the cardinal vs. ordinal interdependence. To explain these
concepts, imagine an auction problem, where each bidder’s willingness-to-
pay depends both on his own type and the other bidders’ types. If one type
of each bidder always has a higher valuation for the good than another type
regardless of the other bidders’ types (even if each type’s valuation itself may
vary with the others’ types), then we say that the environment exhibits only
cardinal interdependence. Conversely, if the types cannot be ordered in such
a uniform manner with respect to the others’ types, then we say that the
environment exhibits ordinal interdependence.3
We first show that, in the environments with only cardinal interdepen-
dence, (both maxmin and Bayesian) foundations exist for ex post mech-
anisms. This includes, for example, private-value environments (in this
sense, our result is a generalization of Chung and Ely (2007)), and the one-
dimensional environments of Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Bergemann
and Morris (2009b).
mechanism, even though he can also offer any other mechanism.
3These interdependence concepts are obviously related to the “size” of interdependence
(e.g., private-value environments are special cases of cardinally interdependent cases).
However, they are not necessarily corresponding to each other. For example, if a bidder’s
valuation in an auction is a sum of a function only of his own type and another function of
the others’ types, then however large is the second term, the environment never exhibits
ordinal interdependence. In this sense, a more appropriate interpretation is that these
interdependent concepts are related to the diversity of interdependence across types.
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Conversely, if the environment exhibits ordinal interdependence, which
is typically the case with multi-dimensional environments (e.g., a player’s
private information comprises a noisy signal of the common value of the auc-
tioned good and an idiosyncratic private-value parameter), then in general,
ex post mechanisms do not have foundation. That is, there exists a non-
ex-post mechanism that achieves strictly higher expected revenue than the
optimal ex post mechanism, regardless of the agents’ high-order beliefs.
Regarding the foundation results, Chen and Li (2016) consider a gen-
eral class of private-value environments where agents have multi-dimensional
payoff types, and show that if the environment satisfies the uniform-shortest-
path-tree property, then the maxmin (and Bayesian) foundation exists for
dominant-strategy mechanisms. This property simply means that, for any al-
location rule the principal desires to implement, the set of binding constraints
is invariant. This holds true in the single-good auction environment of Chung
and Ely (2007) with regularity, and in this sense, their result generalizes that
of Chung and Ely (2007), keeping the private-value assumption. Our work is
a complement to Chen and Li (2016) in that we consider interdependent-value
environments. For our foundation result (Theorem 1), a similar property to
their uniform-shortest-path-tree property holds, which suggests that some
of their argument may be applicable even in interdependent-value environ-
ments.
Regarding the no-foundation results, there are several papers in the lit-
erature that provide examples or a restrictive class of environments in which
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(various versions of) foundations for dominant-strategy or ex post mecha-
nisms do not exist. For example, for interdependent-value environments,
Bergemann and Morris (2005) provide examples in the context of implemen-
tation of certain (“non-separable”) social choice correspondences, and Jehiel,
Meyer-ter Vehn, Moldovanu, and Zame (2006) provide an example for rev-
enue maximization in sequential sales. Chen and Li (2016) also provide
an instance of environment where, without their uniform-shortest-path-tree
property, there might not exist a foundation for dominant-strategy mecha-
nisms, even in private-value environments. Our work contributes to this line
of research by providing a general class of environments with a no-foundation
result (instead of providing examples), and the economic intuition based on
the cardinal vs. ordinal interdependence.
Other closely related papers include Bergemann and Morris (2005) and
Bo¨rgers (2013). In interdependent-value environments, Bergemann and Mor-
ris (2005) show that any separable social choice correspondence that is im-
plementable given any (high-order) belief structure of the agents must satisfy
ex post incentive compatibility. In this sense, they provide another sort of
foundation for ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. Their separable
social choice correspondence necessarily admits a unique non-monetary allo-
cation for each payoff-type profile, and hence, in general, excludes revenue
maximization as the principal’s objective. Thus, our work is complementary
to theirs in that we consider revenue maximization.
Bo¨rgers (2013) criticizes the foundation theorems by constructing a non-
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dominant-strategy (or more generally, a non-ex-post) mechanism that yields
weakly higher expected revenue than the optimal dominant-strategy mech-
anism for any belief structure of the agents, while it yields strictly higher
expected revenue for some belief structures. Our no-foundation result is
stronger in that it provides a strict improvement in expected revenue for
any (high-order) belief structure, though under stronger conditions on the
environment.
2 Model
There exist I ∈ N agents. Agent i’s privately-known payoff type is θi ∈ Θi ⊆
Rd, where |Θi| < ∞.4 A payoff-type profile is written as θ = (θ1, . . . , θI) ∈
Θ1 × . . .×ΘI = Θ. The principal’s (subjective) prior belief for θ is given by
f ∈ ∆(Θ), where we assume f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
Each agent i’s willingness-to-pay for qi ∈ Qi ⊆ R+ units of the good
is denoted by vi(qi, θ). We assume that 0 ∈ Qi, |Qi| < ∞,5 vi(0, θ) = 0,
and vi(·, θ) is increasing for all θ. Moreover, as a standard single-crossing
condition, we assume that, for each θi 6= θ′i, and θ−i, we have either
vi(qi, θi, θ−i)− vi(q′i, θi, θ−i) > vi(qi, θ′i, θ−i)− vi(q′i, θ′i, θ−i), ∀qi > q′i;
4Potential extensions to cases with continuous payoff type spaces are discussed in Sec-
tion 5.
5As it becomes clearer, the finiteness of Qi is without loss of generality (though it
simplifies the notation), given that Θ is finite and we only consider finite mechanisms
(including ex post incentive compatible mechanisms).
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or
vi(qi, θi, θ−i)− vi(q′i, θi, θ−i) < vi(qi, θ′i, θ−i)− vi(q′i, θ′i, θ−i), ∀qi > q′i.
In the first (second) case, we denote θi θ−ii θ′i (θi ≺θ−ii θ′i, respectively). Our
assumption throughout the paper is that ≺θ−ii is a total ordering over Θi for
any θ−i, although ≺θ−ii can be different from ≺
θ′−i
i . Let
η = min
i,θi 6=θ′i,θ−i,qi 6=q′i
|vi(qi, θi, θ−i) + vi(q′i, θ′i, θ−i)− vi(q′i, θi, θ−i)− vi(qi, θ′i, θ−i)| (> 0).
In particular, this implies that, by setting qi > 0 = q
′
i,
|vi(qi, θi, θ−i)− vi(qi, θ′i, θ−i)| ≥ η
for all θi 6= θ′i and θ−i.
Paying pi ∈ R to the principal, agent i’s final payoff is vi(qi, θ) − pi.
The principal’s objective is the total revenue,
∑
i pi. The feasible set of
q = (q1, . . . , qI) is denoted by Q ⊆
∏
iQi, where the shape of Q depends on
the specific environment of interest.
For example, auctions, trading, and public-goods environments are in
this class, with (or without) interdependence. In terms of interdependence,
our framework includes a typical “common + private” environment studied
in the auction literature: Imagine that each agent i has a unit demand for
the good, his payoff-type comprises (ci, di) ∈ Θi ⊆ R2, where ci may be
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interpreted as a “common-value” component and di may be interpreted as
an idiosyncratic “private-value” component, and his valuation for the good
is pii(c1, . . . , cN) + di for some function pii.
2.1 Type space
The agents’ private information includes their own payoff types, their (first-
order) beliefs about their payoff types, and their arbitrarily higher-order
beliefs. To model this, we introduce type spaces as in Bergemann and Morris
(2005).
A (“known-own-payoff-type”) type space, denoted by T = (Ti, θ̂i, pii)Ii=1,
is a collection of a measurable space of types Ti for each agent i, a measurable
function θ̂i : Ti → Θi that describes the agent’s payoff type, and a measurable
function pii : Ti → ∆(T−i) that describes his belief about the others’ types.
Let β̂i(ti) denote the belief hierarchy associated with type ti (i.e., it describes
ti’s first-order belief about θ−i, second-order belief, and so on, up to an
arbitrary high order). We say that T has no redundant types if for each i,
mapping ti 7→ (θ̂i(ti), β̂i(ti)) is one-to-one.
In fact, there exists a (compact) universal type space T ∗ = (T ∗i , θ̂∗i , pi∗i )Ii=1,
such that any type space without redundant types can be embedded into it,
in the following sense.6
Lemma 1. Let T be a type space with no redundant types. Then, for each
6For constructions of universal type spaces, see Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Bran-
denburger and Dekel (1993).
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i, there exist subsets T̂i ⊂ T ∗i and bijections hi : Ti → T̂i such that:
1. θ̂∗i (hi(ti)) = θ̂i(ti) for all ti ∈ Ti; and
2. pi∗i (hi(ti))[h−i(t−i)] = pii(ti)[t−i] for all ti ∈ Ti and t−i ∈ T−i,
where h−i(t−i) = (h1(t1), . . . , hi−1(ti−1), hi+1(ti+1), . . . , hI(tI)).
In what follows, we directly work with this universal type space.7 Specif-
ically, let µ ∈ ∆(T ∗) represent the principal’s prior belief over T ∗ such that
µ({t|θ̂∗(t) = θ}) = f(θ) for each θ, that is, the principal’s (first-order) belief
for θ is given by f(θ), as assumed above. The other information contained
in µ captures the principal’s belief over the agents’ possible belief structures.
Let M⊆ ∆(T ∗) represent the set of all such µ.
In some contexts, it may be reasonable to assume that (the principal
believes that) the agents do not have extreme (non-full-support) first-order
beliefs. For example, instead of assuming that each agent’s belief or knowl-
edge is exogenous, one may be interested in a situation where each agent
engages in his own information acquisition (through which his belief is up-
dated), where the information acquisition cost is a linear function of relative
entropy (Sims (2003)). Then, it is infinitely costly for each agent to know
other agents’ payoff types.
Let Mfull ⊂ M denote the set of µ such that every agent i has a full-
support first-order belief about the other agents. More precisely, for each
7The results would not change even if we allow for type spaces with redundant types,
but more notation would be involved.
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agent i with type ti, let pi
∗1
i (ti) ∈ ∆(Θ−i) denote his first-order belief, that
is, pi∗1i (ti)[θ−i] =
∫
t−i|θ̂∗−i(t−i)=θ−i dpi
∗
i (ti)[t−i] for each θ−i. Then, Mfull is the
set of all µ ∈M such that µ ({t | ∀i, θ−i, pi∗1i (ti)[θ−i] > 0}) = 1.
2.2 Mechanism
The principal designs a mechanism, denoted by (M, q, p), whereMi represents
a message set for each agent i, M = M1 × . . . ×MI , q : M → Q = [0, 1]I
denotes an allocation rule, and p : M → RI denotes a payment function.
Each agent i reports a message mi ∈ Mi simultaneously, and then he re-
ceives the good with probability qi(m) and pays pi(m) to the principal. We
assume that Mi contains a non-participation message ∅ ∈ Mi such that(
qi(∅,m−i), pi(∅,m−i)
)
= (0, 0) for any m−i ∈M−i.
We now introduce a class of mechanisms with ex post incentive compat-
ibility (an EPIC mechanism for short).
Definition 1. An EPIC mechanism is a mechanism Γ = (M, q, p) such that,
for each i, (i) Mi = Θi, and (ii) for each θ ∈ Θ and θi 6= θ′i ∈ Θi:
vi(qi(θ), θ)− pi(θ) ≥ 0,
vi(qi(θ), θ)− pi(θ) ≥ vi(qi(θ′i, θ−i), θ)− pi(θ′i, θ−i).
The expected revenue in the truth-telling (ex post) equilibrium in an
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EPIC mechanism is given by:
Rf (Γ) =
∑
θ
∑
i
pi(θ)f(θ).
Note that this does not depend on µ, and in this sense, Rf (Γ) may be
interpreted as a “robustly guaranteed” expected revenue with respect to the
agents’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs. Let REPf denote the maximum ex-
pected revenue among all EPIC mechanisms.
Applying the standard argument, the optimal mechanism among all EPIC
mechanisms is characterized by the corresponding virtual-value maximiza-
tion. To explain this, let Fi(θi, θ−i) =
∑
θ˜iθ−ii θi
f(θ˜i, θ−i) denote the cumu-
lative distribution function of i’s payoff types given the other agents’ payoff-
type profile θ−i.
Agent i’s virtual valuation at payoff-type profile θ is given by:
γi(qi, θ) = vi(qi, θ)− 1− Fi(θ)
f(θ)
(
v+i (qi, θ)− vi(qi, θ)
)
,
where v+i (θi, θ−i) = minθ˜iθ−ii θi
vi(θ˜i, θ−i) whenever the right-hand side is well-
defined; otherwise γi(qi, θ) = vi(qi, θ).
The following result is standard, so we omit its proof.
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Lemma 2.
REPf = max
q:Θ→Q
∑
θ
∑
i
γi(qi(θ), θ)f(θ)
sub. to ∀i, θi, θ′i, θ−i;
θi θ−ii θ′i ⇒ qi(θi, θ−i) ≥ qi(θ′i, θ−i). (M)
We assume that the solution exists in this maximization problem, which
we denote by qEP = (qEPi (θ))i,θ. The corresponding payment rule is denoted
by pEP = (pEPi (θ))i,θ.
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As in Chung and Ely (2007), we further assume the following “regularity”
condition throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. There exists ε > 0 such that, for any distribution over Θ, f˜ ,
such that ‖f˜−f‖ < ε (in a Euclidean distance), the monotonicity constraints
(M) are not binding in the problem of REP
f˜
. In particular, this implies
REPf = max
q:Θ→Q
∑
θ
∑
i
γi(qi(θ), θ)f(θ).
Of course, the conditions on the environment that imply the above as-
8pEP is given as follows. For each i, θi and θ−i, (i) if there is no θ′i ≺θ−ii θi, then
pEPi (θ) = vi(q
EP
i (θ), θ);
(ii) otherwise, letting θ′i ≺θ−ii θi be such that no θ′′i satisfies θ′i ≺θ−ii θ′′i ≺θ−ii θi,
pEPi (θ) = vi(q
EP
i (θ), θ)− vi(qEPi (θ′i, θ−i), θ) + pEPi (θ′i, θ−i).
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sumption can vary with the environment. For example, in an auction en-
vironment with Q = {q ∈ {0, 1}N |∑i qi ≤ 1}, the regularity assumption is
satisfied if, for each i 6= j, and θ,9
γi(θ) ≥ γj(θ)⇒ ∀θ′i > θi, γi(θ′i, θ−i) > γj(θ′i, θ−i).
In a digital-good environment of Goldberg, Hartline, Karlin, Saks, and Wright
(2006) with Q = {0, 1}N , the regularity assumption is satisfied under the
strict monotone hazard rate condition, i.e., for each i and θ, 1−Fi(θ)
f(θ)
is de-
creasing in θi. In a multi-unit sales environment as in Mussa and Rosen
(1978), the regularity assumption is satisfied under the strict monotone haz-
ard rate condition and concavity of each vi with respect to qi.
The following notation is extensively used in the subsequent analysis. For
each i and qi > 0, define
Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) = {θi ∈ Θi|qEPi (θi, θ−i) ≥ qi}
as the set of i’s payoff types whose allocation given θ−i is greater than or
equal to qi in the optimal EPIC mechanism. Note that, by monotonicity,
if θi ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) and θ′i θ−ii θi, then θ′i ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i). Let θ∗i (qi, θ−i) be
the lowest element in Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) with respect to ≺θ−ii , that is, for any θi ∈
9Chung and Ely (2007) call it the single-crossing condition. A stronger sufficient condi-
tion is the combination of the strict monotone hazard rate property (i.e., for each i and θ,
1−Fi(θ)
f(θ) is decreasing in θi), and affiliation in f (which includes independent f as a special
case).
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Θ∗i (qi, θ−i), we have θi θ−ii θ∗i (qi, θ−i). This θ∗i (qi, θ−i) is called i’s threshold
type with respect to qi given θ−i. Finally, let
Θ∗−i(qi, θi) = {θ−i ∈ Θ−i|θi ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i)}
denote the set of θ−i with which θi is allocated greater than or equal to qi
units in the optimal EPIC mechanism.
2.3 Foundations
For a non-EPIC mechanism, expected revenue may vary with the agents’
belief structure, and the principal—who does not know the agents’ belief
structure—may not want to offer a mechanism if the expected revenue is
low for some possible belief structures. Following Chung and Ely (2007),
we say that there is a maxmin foundation for EPIC mechanisms if, for any
non-EPIC mechanism Γ = (M, q, p), there exists µ ∈ M such that, for any
Bayesian equilibrium σ∗, the expected revenue obtained in the equilibrium
is less than REPf , that is:
∫
t∈T
∑
i
pi(σ
∗(t))dµ ≤ REPf .
If there exists a single µ ∈ M that achieves the above inequality for all
Γ, then we say that there is a Bayesian foundation for EPIC mechanisms.10
10These definitions are consistent with the verbal explanations of the corresponding
definitions in Chung and Ely (2007). However, in fact, the mathematical definitions of
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In the context where (the principal believes that) the agents have full-
support first-order beliefs, we replace M by Mfull in the above definitions,
and we say that there is a strong maxmin / Bayesian foundation for EPIC
mechanisms.
3 Without ordinal interdependence
First, we consider the case where, for each i, θ−i, and θ′−i, ≺θ−ii =≺
θ′−i
i . This
includes the private-value environment (as in Chung and Ely (2007)) as a
special case, but also includes some interdependent-value environments. For
example, assume that Θi ⊆ R and vi(qi, θi, θ−i) is an increasing function of θi
for each given qi, θ−i. Because i’s payoff is affected by θ−i, the environment
exhibits interdependence, but it is only cardinal interdependence in the sense
that a higher value of θi corresponds to a higher type with respect to ≺θ−ii
for any θ−i.
On the other hand, even if vi is increasing in θi, if Θi ⊆ Rd with d > 1, it
them in Chung and Ely (2007) are slightly different: for example, their mathematical
definition of maxmin foundation says that, for any non-EPIC mechanism Γ = (M, q, p),
inf
µ∈M
[
max
σ∗:Bayesian equilibrium
∫
t∈T
∑
i
pi(σ
∗(t))dµ
]
≤ REPf .
To see the difference, let R(µ) denote the term inside the bracket on the left-hand side
(i.e., the expected revenue given µ), and imagine a case where (i) R(µ) > REPf for any
µ, while (ii) for any ε > 0, there exists µ such that R(µ) − ε < REPf . That is, the non-
EPIC mechanism Γ is a strict improvement over the optimal EPIC mechanism, while it
is not a uniform improvement. The verbal definition of Chung and Ely (2007) (which we
follow in this paper) suggests that there is no maxmin foundation, while their mathematical
definition says there is. The difference is not innocuous, because the non-EPIC mechanism
we propose is indeed such a mechanism.
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is possible to have ≺θ−ii 6=≺
θ′−i
i for some θ−i and θ
′
−i. For example, consider an
auction environment in which each agent i’s payoff-type comprises (ci, di) ∈
Θi ⊆ R2, where ci denotes a “common-value” component and di denotes an
idiosyncratic “private-value” component, and his valuation for the good is
pii(c1, . . . , cN)+di for some function pii strictly increasing in all the arguments.
Then, for (ci, di), (c
′
i, d
′
i) ∈ Θi such that ci < c′i and di > d′i, it is possible
that, given some c−i, (ci, di) has a higher valuation for the good than (c′i, d
′
i)
(i.e., pii(ci, c−i) + di > pii(c′i, c−i) + d
′
i), while given another c
′
−i, (ci, di) has a
lower valuation than (c′i, d
′
i).
Such environments with ordinal interdependence are studied in the next
section.
Definition 2. We have ordinal interdependence if there exists i, θ−i, and θ′−i
such that ≺θ−ii 6=≺
θ′−i
i .
Generalizing Chung and Ely (2007) (for private-value auction environ-
ments), we show that no ordinal interdependence implies the strong maxmin
/ Bayesian foundations for EPIC mechanisms.
Theorem 1. With Assumption 1 and no ordinal interdependence, EPIC
mechanisms have the strong Bayesian (and hence strong maxmin) founda-
tion.
Our proof for Theorem 1 is a direct extension of Chung and Ely (2007)
in the private-value setting to the interdependent-value environment. We
provide a sketch of the proof here, and the formal proof in the Appendix.
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First, we impose the non-singularity condition on the payoff-type distri-
bution f , which says that f satisfies certain full-rank conditions, and consider
the Bayesian mechanism design problem with a simple type space having a
particular belief structure. We show that under such a belief structure, it is
without loss of generality to treat all participation constraints and all “adja-
cent downward” incentive constraints with equality, and ignore all the other
constraints. Then we show that the total expected revenue in this Bayesian
problem is maximized by the optimal EPIC mechanism.
The next step is to relax the non-singularity assumption by choosing a
sequence of non-singular distributions which converge to the given payoff-
type distribution. Since the optimal EPIC mechanisms achieve the highest
expected revenue over the sequence of simple type spaces with the particular
belief structure, by taking the limit, we show that the Bayesian foundation
also exists for any arbitrary payoff-type distribution, as long as Assumption
1 is satisfied.11
4 With ordinal interdependence
In this section, we consider the environment that further satisfies the follow-
ing conditions.
Assumption 2 (“Highest Payoff Type”). For each i, there exists θ¯i ∈ Θi
such that, for each θi ∈ Θi and θ−i ∈ Θ−i, we have θ¯i θ−ii θi.
11In their paper, they show by example that, without the condition corresponding to
Assumption 1, there may not exist a Bayesian foundation.
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Assumption 3 (“Richness”). For each i, qi, θi, θ
′
i and θ−i such that vi(qi, θi, θ−i) >
vi(qi, θ
′
i, θ−i), there exists θ
′
−i such that θi ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ′−i) and θ′i /∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ′−i).
The highest-payoff-type assumption is satisfied if Θ is a complete sub-
lattice in Rd, vi(qi, θ) is increasing in θ. The richness assumption connects
the difference among i’s different payoff types and the difference among their
allocations. For example, consider an auction environment where each i’s
payoff type is (ci, di) ∈ Ci × Di(= Θi) where Ci, Di ⊆ R, and his valuation
is pii(c) + di. The richness assumption would be easily satisfied if each Dj is
rich enough so that, if pii(ci, c−i) + di > pii(c′i, c−i) + d
′
i for some ci, c
′
i ∈ Ci,
di, d
′
i ∈ Di and c−i ∈ C−i, then we can find some d−i such that agent i’s
virtual value is the highest given (ci, di) (and (c−i, d−i)) but not given (c′i, d
′
i)
(and (c−i, d−i)).
In this environment, EPIC mechanisms have the strong (maxmin and
Bayesian) foundation if and only if we do not have ordinal interdependence.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1-3, EPIC mechanisms have the strong
foundation if and only if we do not have ordinal interdependence.
Before the formal proof of the theorem, we provide the basic intuition
through the following two examples.
Example 1. Assume I = 2, Θ1 = Θ2 = {1, 2}, and Q = {0, 1}2. Table 1
collects payoff-type distribution f , agent 1’s valuation and virtual value at
each payoff type profile, and the corresponding optimal EPIC allocation for
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agent 1. For agent 2, assume that v2(θ) = θ2 + 1 for all θ so that the optimal
EPIC allocation for him is (qEP2 (θ), p
EP
2 (θ)) = (1, 2) for all θ.
Table 1: Auction environment of Example 1.
f, v1, γ1, (q
EP
1 , p
EP
1 ) θ2 = 1 θ2 = 2
θ1 = 1
1
6
, 2, 2, (1, 1) 1
6
, 1, −1, (0, 0)
θ1 = 2
1
3
, 1, 1
2
, (1, 1) 1
3
, 2, 2, (1, 2)
We have Θ∗1(q1, θ2) = {1, 2} if (q1, θ2) = (1, 1) and Θ∗1(q1, θ2) = {2} if
(q1, θ2) = (1, 2). Hence, the threshold payoff type of agent 1 given θ2 = 1
(i.e., θ1 = 2) is assigned the goods given θ2 = 2, but the non-threshold
winning payoff type of agent 1 given θ2 = 1 (i.e., θ1 = 1) is unassigned given
θ2 = 2. This reversal of the order over agent 1’s payoff types is crucial for
the no-foundation result.
Now we consider a modification of the optimal EPIC mechanism, which
asks agent 1’s first-order belief. More specifically, agent 1 is asked to report
his payoff type θ1 and his belief for θ2 = 1, that is:
y(t1) =
∫
t2|θ̂2(t2)=1
dpi1(t1)[t2].
If he reports θ1 = 1 and first-order belief y ∈ [0, 1], agent 1 obtains the
goods by paying (2 − cosα) under θ2 = 1, but fails to get the goods and
still needs to pay (1 − sinα) under θ2 = 2, where α = arc tan 1−yy . We keep
the optimal EPIC allocations for both agents in the other cases. It is easy
to verify that the new mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible over the
universal type space.
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Because we are interested in the strong foundation, assume that (the
principal believes that) agent 1 always has a full-support first-order belief,
that is, y ∈ (0, 1) with (µ-)probability one. Then, agent 1 with θ1 = 1 always
pays strictly more than under the optimal EPIC mechanism regardless of
his (full-support) first-order belief and agent 2’s true payoff type: if θ2 = 1,
agent 1 pays 2 − cosα for some α ∈ (0, pi
2
), which is strictly greater than 1;
if θ2 = 2, agent 1 pays 1− sinα for some α ∈ (0, pi2 ), which is strictly greater
than 0.
Therefore, this new mechanism raises strictly higher expected revenue
than the optimal EPIC mechanism, as long as agent 1 has a full-support
first-order belief.
Example 2. Assume I = 2, Θ1 = {1, 2, 3}, Θ2 = {1, 2} and Q = {0, 1}2. Ta-
ble 2 collects payoff-type distribution f , agent 1’s valuation and virtual value
at each payoff type profile, and the corresponding optimal EPIC allocation
for agent 1. Clearly, agent 1’s preference exhibits ordinal interdependence.
Table 2: Auction environment of Example 2.
f, v1, γ1, (q
EP
1 , p
EP
1 ) θ2 = 1 θ2 = 2
θ1 = 1
1
6
, 3, 3, (1, 2) 1
6
, 3, 3, (1, 2)
θ1 = 2
1
6
, 2, 1, (1, 2) 1
6
, 1, −1, (0, 0)
θ1 = 3
1
6
, 1, −1, (0, 0) 1
6
, 2, 1, (1, 2)
We have Θ∗1(q1, θ2) = {1, 2} if (q1, θ2) = (1, 1) and Θ∗1(q1, θ2) = {1, 3} if
(q1, θ2) = (1, 2). Hence, neither of these two sets is the subset of the other
one, which never happens when we have only cardinal interdependence. Now
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we construct a new detail-free mechanism as follows. When agent 1 reports
θ1 = 1 and first-order belief y, agent 1 obtains the goods by paying (3−cosα)
under θ2 = 1 and obtains the goods by paying (3−sinα) under θ2 = 2, where
α = arg tan 1−y
y
. We keep the optimal EPIC mechanism for both agents in
the other cases. It is easy to check that the new mechanism is Bayesian
incentive compatible over the universal type space. Since we assume full-
support beliefs, that is, y ∈ (0, 1), then the payment from agent 1 is always
strictly greater than 2, the optimal EPIC payment rule, given any θ2. Thus,
the new mechanism raises strictly higher expected revenue than the optimal
EPIC mechanism regardless of the agents’ (high-order) beliefs, resulting in
no foundation for the EPIC mechanisms.
The two examples above identify some cases where revenue improvement
is possible. Motivated by them, we define the concept of improvability as
follows.
Definition 3 (“Improvability”). Revenue from i is improvable with respect
to (θi, θ−i, θ′−i) if there exists qi and q
′
i such that at least one of the following
holds:
(i) θi ∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i)∩Θ∗i (qi, θ−i), and θ∗i (qi, θ−i) /∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i), and θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) /∈
Θ∗i (qi, θ−i);
(ii) θi ∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) \Θ∗i (qi, θ−i), and θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i);
(iii) θi ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) \Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i), and θ∗i (qi, θ−i) ∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i).
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The examples essentially show that, given the optimal EPIC mecha-
nism, if the revenue from some agent i is improvable with respect to some
(θi, θ−i, θ′−i), then the strong foundation does not exist. Thus, we complete
the proof of Theorem 2 by showing that the ordinal interdependence neces-
sarily implies the improvability. See the appendix for the formal proof.
Next, we study if EPIC mechanisms have the (not necessarily strong)
foundation. The following example suggests that the same mechanism as
above does not generally work, if the agents have non-full-support first-order
beliefs.
Example 3. In the new mechanism proposed in Example 1, if we allow
for non-full-support beliefs, there exists a situation where agent 1 always
correctly predicts agent 2’s payoff types. Formally, let C = {t ∈ T |θ̂(t) =
(1, 1), pi1(t1)[1] = 1}, C ′ = {t ∈ T |θ̂(t) = (1, 2), pi1(t1)[2] = 1}, and consider
µ such that µ(C) = f(1, 1) and µ(C ′) = f(1, 2). Because the optimal choice
for agent 1 is y = 1 (or reporting y = 1 as his belief for θ2 = 1) if t ∈ C, and
y = 0 if t ∈ C ′, the equilibrium payments in the new mechanism coincide
with those in the optimal EPIC mechanism. Thus, without the full-support
belief assumption, the new mechanism in Example 1 only weakly improves
the expected revenue.
Now we further modify the mechanism as follows. Unless agent 1 reports
θ1 = 1 and y = 0, the allocation is the same as the previous mechanism
proposed in Example 1. If agent 1 reports θ1 = 1 and y = 0, then the
following events happen: agent 1 does not buy the good for any θ2, he pays
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M(> 3) if θ2 = 1 (i.e., when his belief turns out to be “wrong”), and the
principal offers price 3 for agent 2 (so that agent 2 buys only if θ2 = 2, i.e.,
when agent 1’s belief turns out to be “right”), instead of price 2. It is easy
to verify that the new mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible on the
universal type space T ∗.
This new mechanism achieves a weakly higher expected revenue than in
the optimal EPIC mechanism. First, this weak improvement is obvious unless
θ1 = 1 and y = 0. If θ1 = 1 and y = 0, the principal earns M > 3 from agent
1 if θ2 = 1 (while the optimal EPIC mechanism yields total revenue 3), and
earns 3 from agent 2 if θ2 = 2 (while the optimal EPIC mechanism yields
total revenue 2).
To show a strict improvement in expected revenue for any µ ∈ M, con-
sider the case where θ1 = 1 and θ2 = 2. Because f(1, 2) > 0, it suffices to
show that, for any y ∈ [0, 1] reported by agent 1, the new mechanism achieves
a strictly higher revenue than 2, the revenue in the optimal EPIC mechanism.
First, as we see above, if y = 0 is reported, then the new mechanism yields
3 (from agent 2), and hence there is a strict improvement. If y > 0, then
agent 2 pays 2, and agent 1 pays 1 − sin(arc tan 1−y
y
) > 0, and hence, there
is again a strict improvement.
Notice that the key for strict improvement is to use agent 1’s belief to
modify the price for agent 2. If agent 1 is correct, such modification is
profitable for the principal. Otherwise, the principal collects a “fine” from
agent 1, which is also profitable.
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As suggested in the example, it seems impossible to raise any additional
revenue from an agent if he always correctly predicts the other agents’ payoff
types. Instead, in such a case, a natural alternative idea is to use this agent’s
prediction to raise additional revenue from the other agents (and to fine him
if his prediction turns out to be wrong in order for the principal to “hedge”,
as in the example above). Because this means that we need to be able to
change an agent’s allocation without changing the others’, we assume that
the feasible allocation set Q is a product set, Q =
∏
iQi, in what follows.
In addition, even if an agent correctly predicts the occurrence of some
θ−i (or its non-occurrence), such information does not necessarily make the
principal earn strictly more revenue from the other agents (for example, in
auction, imagine that any j(6= i)’s virtual valuation is negative given θ−i).
Thus, we need a stronger version of the improvability.
Definition 4. We have the strong improvability if there exist i, θi, θj, qj, θ−ij
such that θj ∈ Θ∗j(qj, θi, θ−ij), and that revenue from i is improvable with
respect to
(
θi, (θj, θ−ij), (θ∗j (qj, θi, θ−ij), θ−ij)
)
.
Roughly, the strong improvability implies that, if agent i with θi correctly
predicts that −i’s payoff types are not θ′−i, then (given θ−ij) the principal
can know that j’s type is not a threshold type for some qj. Such information
enables the principal to earn higher expected revenue from j.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 2-3 and Q =
∏
iQi, strong improvabil-
ity implies no foundation of EPIC mechanisms.
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A natural question is, under which additional conditions on the environ-
ment, the ordinal interdependence implies the strong improvability, so that
EPIC mechanisms do not have the foundation if and only if we do not have
the ordinal interdependence. A sufficient condition is the following richness
condition on Q.
Assumption 4. For each i, θi, and θ−i, we have qEPi (θi, θ−i) > 0, and for
each θ′i 6= θi, we have qEPi (θi, θ−i) 6= qEPi (θ′i, θ−i).
A representative example is a monopoly problem with multiple buyers and
multiple units of trading.12 Note that this excludes some situations where
the lowest payoff type of an agent (given the other agents’ payoff types) is
“excluded” from trading.
Theorem 3. Under Assumption 4 and Q =
∏
iQi, EPIC mechanisms have
the foundation if and only if we do not have ordinal interdependence.
5 Discussion: Continuous payoff-type space
In the previous finite payoff-type setup, given the others’ payoff-type profiles,
the difference in valuations between any two payoff types is strictly positive
and bounded away from 0, which enables us to exploit the “gaps” in valua-
tions and increase the payments. However, if we have infinitely many payoff
12See Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Segal (2003) (or their straightforward generaliza-
tions) for such environments, although they focus on private-value environments.
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types, such “gaps” may not exist, since η defined in Section 2 could be equal
to 0, and then the previous construction no longer works.
In this sense, the continuous payoff-type space case is more complicated
than the finite case, and hence the analysis of the continuous case is beyond
the scope of the current paper.13 Nevertheless, it may be interesting to note
how our approach may be useful (with appropriate modifications), even in
the continuous case. The following example explains this.
We assume I = 2, Θ1 = {0, 1} × [0, 2](3 (c1, d1)), Θ2 = {0, 1}(3 c2), and
Q = {0, 1}2. Agent 1’s valuation for q1 = 1 is v1(c1, d1, c2) = c1c2 + d1, and
agent 2’s valuation for q2 = 1 is v2(c2) = 1 +
8
7
c2.
14 One may interpret ci as
a (binary) common-value component, and d1 as a private-value component
for agent 1. Essentially, the only difference from the previous sections is that
agent 1 now has a continuous payoff-type space. The other specifications are
for simplicity.
For the principal’s prior for θ, assume that each ci takes 0 or 1 equally
likely, independently from c−i. Independently from c2, the density of d1 given
13Generalizing Theorem 1 to the continuous case (even in the private-value environment
as in Chung and Ely (2007)) may also be non-trivial.
14We omit q1, q2 in the arguments of v1, v2 for brevity.
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c1 is:
f(d1|c1 = 0) =

3
4
if d1 ∈ [0, 1],
1
4
if d1 ∈ [1, 2],
f(d1|c1 = 1) =

1
4
if d1 ∈ [0, 1],
3
4
if d1 ∈ [1, 2].
We can show that the optimal EPIC mechanism (q∗i , p
∗
i )i=1,2 is given as
follows:
q∗1(c1, d1, c2) =
 1 if c1c2 + d1 ≥
3
4
c2 + 1,
0 otherwise,
p∗1(c1, d1, c2) = (
3
4
c2 + 1)q
∗
1(c1, d1, c2),
q∗2(c1, d1, c2) =
 1 if c2 = 1,0 if c2 = 0,
p∗2(c1, d1, c2) =
15
7
q∗2(c1, d1, c2).
This mechanism can be interpreted as a posted-price mechanism, where
the price for agent 2 is always 15
7
(so that only high-value type of agent 2
buys), and the price for agent 1 is 3
4
c2 + 1, varying with c2.
Our basic idea for improvement is very similar to the finite case in the
previous section. However, to explain the basic incentive issues, we first
consider the following “bundling” interpretation. Imagine that the seller is
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selling to agent 1 a right to obtain the good when c2 = 0, and another right
to obtain the good when c2 = 1. To buy the bundle, agent 1 pays 1 when
c2 = 0 and
7
4
when c2 = 1, as in the optimal EPIC mechanism. Similarly, to
buy only when c2 = 1 (but not when c2 = 0), agent 1 pays
7
4
when c2 = 1.
However, to buy only when c2 = 0 (but not when c2 = 1), agent 1 pays 1− ε
for a small ε > 0.
If agent 1’s purchase behavior is the same as in the optimal EPIC mech-
anism (in particular, if agent 1 buys both when c2 = 0 and c2 = 1 as long
as d1 ≥ 1 and c1 + d1 ≥ 74), then this new mechanism achieves a strictly
higher expected revenue. However, such a behavior may not be incentive
compatible. For example, if agent 1 believes that c2 = 0 with probability
very close to 1, then no payoff type of agent 1 would buy the bundle: even
for the highest payoff-type (i.e., (c1, d1) = (1, 2)), it would be better to buy
the good only when c2 = 0 (with price 1− ε) than to buy the good for both
c2 ∈ {0, 1}. Such a deviation makes the expected revenue much smaller than
under the optimal EPIC mechanism.
To avoid this, we introduce the following side bet: if (and only if) agent
1 buys the bundle, he can further buy a lottery that yields to him ε if c2 = 0,
and −bε if c2 = 1 (for some b ∈ (87 , 97)). Furthermore, if agent 1 buys this
lottery, then with probability ε, the principal offers price 1 instead of 15
7
to
agent 2 (and the principal continues to offer price 15
7
to agent 2 with the
other probability 1− ε).
Then, as long as d1 ≥ 1 and c1 + d1 ≥ 74 + bε, agent 1 prefers to “buying
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the bundle and the lottery” to “buying only when c2 = 0”, regardless of his
belief. Whether or not he actually buys the lottery depends on his belief.
However, observe that regardless of the true state, the expected revenue of
the principal from the lottery is always non-negative: if c2 = 0, the principal
pays ε to agent 1 while he earns additional revenue 1 from agent 2 with
probability ε (hence, the expected revenue gain is non-negative); if c2 = 1,
the principal receives bε from agent 1 while he loses revenue 8
7
from agent
2 with probability ε (hence, the expected revenue gain is non-negative for
b > 8
7
). Therefore, the worst-case scenario for the principal is that agent 1
never buys the lottery.
On the other hand, if d1 > 1 and c1 + d1 ∈ (74 , 74 + bε), the worst-case
scenario is that agent 1 buys only when c2 = 0, even though he buys both
for c2 ∈ {0, 1} in the optimal EPIC mechanism. This revenue loss occurs
regardless of agent 1’s belief, and this is one of the fundamental differences
from the (generic) finite case where only the gain exists as long as the agents
have full-support first-order beliefs.
Nevertheless, the overall expected revenue change is strictly positive, at
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least for sufficiently small ε, which is approximately:
(1− ε) Pr(d1 ∈ (1− ε, 1), c1 + d1 < 7
4
) Pr(c2 = 0)
−εPr(d1 > 1, c1 + d1 < 7
4
) Pr(c2 = 0)
−Pr(d1 > 1, c1 + d1 ∈ (7
4
,
7
4
+ bε)) Pr(c2 = 1)
' 3ε
16
− 3ε
64
− 7bε
64
,
which is positive if b < 9
7
. The first term (on the left-hand side) is because
agent 1 whose payoff type satisfies d1 ∈ (1 − ε, 1) and c1 + d1 < 74 does not
buy in any state in the optimal EPIC mechanism, while he buys when c2 = 0
in the modified mechanism. The second term is because, for agent 1 whose
payoff type satisfies d1 > 1 and c1 +d1 <
7
4
, the price he pays in the modified
mechanism (when c2 = 0) is smaller by ε. The third term is because agent
1 whose payoff type satisfies d1 > 1 and c1 + d1 ∈ (74 , 74 + bε) buys both for
c2 ∈ {0, 1} in the optimal EPIC mechanism, while he buys only when c2 = 0
in the modified mechanism.15
This is, of course, just one example, and whether a similar approach
works more generally is left to be determined. However, we believe that,
as demonstrated in this example, our basic idea of modifying mechanisms
carries over even to some continuous environments.
15There are other changes in agent 1’s behavior, but their effects on the expected revenue
are o(ε), and hence omitted.
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6 Conclusion
If the environment exhibits only cardinal interdependence (and certain regu-
larity conditions), then there exist the maxmin and Bayesian foundations for
EPIC mechanisms, in the sense of Chung and Ely (2007). If the environment
exhibits ordinal interdependence, (and certain additional conditions), then
such a foundation may not exist.
In interdependent-value environments, Yamashita (2015) provides an al-
ternative solution concept (that is, incentive compatibility in value revela-
tion), which is also robust to the agents’ belief structure in a related sense
and useful in the implementation of social choice correspondences in un-
dominated strategies. It may be interesting to investigate similar sorts of
foundation results for this alternative solution concept.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Because θ−ii =
θ′−i
i for all i, θ−i, and θ
′
−i, we denote this ordering by i
with no superscript. Also, let Θi = {θ1i , . . . , θNi } (where N = |Θi|) so that
θni ≺i θn+1i for all n = 1, . . . , N − 1.
Consider the simple type space T̂ f = (Ti, θ̂i, pii)Ii=1 with Ti = Θi and the
agents’ beliefs defined by pii(θ
n
i )[θ−i] =
(∑
θ′−i∈Θ−i Gi(θ
n
i , θ
′
−i)
)−1
Gi(θ
n
i , θ−i)
for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i, where Gi(θni , θ−i) =
∑N
k=n f(θ
k
i , θ−i). By convention,
Gi(θ
N+1
i , θ−i) = 0.
The optimal Bayesian mechanism given this simple type space achieves:
V (f) = max
(q,p):Θ→Q×RI
∑
θ∈Θ
f(θ)
∑
i∈I
pi(θ)
s.t. ∀i ∈ I, ∀n, l ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀θ ∈ Θ :∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pii(θ
n
i )[θ−i]
(
vi(qi(θ
n
i , θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i)− pi(θni , θ−i)
) ≥ 0, (BIRni )
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pii(θ
n
i )[θ−i]
(
vi(qi(θ
n
i , θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i)− pi(θni , θ−i)
)
≥
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pii(θ
n
i )[θ−i]
(
vi(qi(θ
l
i, θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i)− pi(θli, θ−i)
)
. (BICn→li )
Because the identity function θ̂i is one-to-one, by Lemma 1, T̂ f can be
embedded in the universal type space T ∗ through a bijection h such that
tni = hi(θ
n
i ). Thus, V (f) provides an upper bound for the best expected
revenue given the universal type space T ∗ (and the principal’s belief µ∗ ∈M
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such that µ∗(h(θ̂−1(θ))) = f(θ)). Therefore, in order to show the Bayesian
foundation for EPIC mechanisms given f , it suffices to show that V (f) ≤
REPf .
We first prove the claim by imposing the non-singularity condition on f ,
which assumes that Ωi = (f(θ
1
i , ·), . . . , f(θNi , ·))ᵀ has rank N for each i, where
f(θni , ·) = (f(θ1i , θ−i))θ−i∈Θ−i is a (I − 1)N -dimensional vector.
Lemma 3. In the solution of V (f), (BICn→n−1i ) holds with equality for all
i and n 6= 1, and (BIRni ) holds with equality for all i and n.
The lemma implies that, for all i and n:
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pii(θ
n
i )[θ−i]
(
vi(qi(θ
n
i , θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i)− pi(θni , θ−i)
)
=
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pii(θ
n
i )[θ−i]
(
vi(qi(θ
n−1
i , θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i)− pi(θn−1i , θ−i)
)
= 0,
or equivalently:
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
( ∑
θ′−i∈Θ−i
Gi(θ
n
i , θ
′
−i)
)−1
Gi(θ
n
i , θ−i)
(
vi(qi(θ
n
i , θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i)− pi(θni , θ−i)
)
= 0,
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
( ∑
θ′−i∈Θ−i
Gi(θ
n
i , θ
′
−i)
)−1
Gi(θ
n
i , θ−i)
(
vi(qi(θ
n−1
i , θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i)− pi(θn−1i , θ−i)
)
= 0.
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This implies:
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
Gi(θ
n
i , θ−i)vi(qi(θ
n
i , θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i) =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
Gi(θ
n
i , θ−i)pi(θ
n
i , θ−i),
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
Gi(θ
n
i , θ−i)vi(qi(θ
n−1
i , θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i) =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
Gi(θ
n
i , θ−i)pi(θ
n−1
i , θ−i)
)
,
and therefore, the objective becomes:
∑
i∈I
Ni∑
n=1
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
f(θni , θ−i)pi(θ
n
i , θ−i)
=
∑
i∈I
Ni∑
n=1
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
(
Gi(θ
n
i , θ−i)−Gi(θn+1i , θ−i)
)
pi(θ
n
i , θ−i)
=
∑
i∈I
Ni∑
n=1
 ∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
Gi(θ
n
i , θ−i)pi(θ
n
i , θ−i)−
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
Gi(θ
n+1
i , θ−i)pi(θ
n
i , θ−i)

=
∑
i∈I
Ni∑
n=1
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
(
Gi(θ
n
i , θ−i)vi(qi(θ
n
i , θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i)−Gi(θn+1i , θ−i)vi(qi(θni , θ−i), θn+1i , θ−i)
)
=
∑
i∈I
∑
θ∈Θ
f(θ)γi(qi, θ).
Therefore, under Assumption 1, we have V (f) = REPf .
Proof. (of the lemma)
We first show that each upward incentive constraint, (BICn→li ) with n <
l, can be ignored without loss. Let Πi =
(
pii(θ
1
i ), . . . , pii(θ
N
i )
)ᵀ
denote the
matrix of agent i’s beliefs, where each pii(θ
n
i ) is a (I−1)N -dimensional vector.
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Then:
Πi =

κ1i · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · κNi

N×N

1 · · · 1
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 1

N×N
Ω,
where κni =
(∑
θ−i∈Θ−i Gi(θ
n
i , θ−i)
)−1
, and hence Πi has a rank N . Thus,
there exists λ ∈ R(I−1)N such that:
Πiλ = (1, . . . , 1, 0︸︷︷︸
l-th element
, . . . , 0)ᵀ.
If we add λ to pi(θ
l
i, ·), each BICn→li with n < l is relaxed, while no other
(BIC) and (BIR) constraints are affected. Moreover, from pii(θ
l
i) ·λ = 0 and
pii(θ
l+1
i ) · λ = 0, we obtain:
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
Gi(θ
l
i, θ−i)λ(θ−i) = 0,
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
Gi(θ
l+1
i , θ−i)λ(θ−i) = 0,
which implies that
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i f(θ
l
i, θ−i)λ(θ−i) = 0, that is, the principal’s ex-
pected revenue is also unaffected.
Next, we show that for any mechanism (q, p) satisfying the remaining
constraints, there exists a mechanism (q′, p′) which satisfies not only the
remaining constraints, but also (BIRni ) for n = 1, . . . , N and (BIC
n→n−1
i )
for n = 2, . . . , N with equality, and raises at least as high expected revenue
as (q, p).
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Given any such mechanism (q, p), if (BICn→n−1i ) is satisfied with strict
inequality for some i and n, then let βn→n−1i be the amount of the slackness of
this constraint (BICn→n−1i ). Let Π
′
i be the matrix generated by substituting
the n-th row of Πi with the vector f(θ
n−1, ·). That is:
Π′i =

κ1i · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
...
0 · · · κn−1i 0 0 · · · 0
0 · · · 0 1 0 · · · 0
0 · · · 0 0 κn+1i · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · κNi


1 · · · 1 1 1 · · · 1
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
...
0 · · · 1 1 1 · · · 1
0 · · · 1 0 0 · · · 0
0 · · · 0 0 1 · · · 1
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 1

Ω,
and hence, Π′i has a rank N . Thus, there exists λ ∈ R(I−1)N such that:
Π′iλ = (0, . . . , 0, 1︸︷︷︸
n-th element
, 0, . . . , 0)ᵀ.
Because pii(θ
n−1
i ) · λ = 0 and f(θn−1, ·) · λ = 1, we have:
pii(θ
n
i ) · λ =
κni
κn−1i
pii(θ
n−1
i ) · λ− κni f(θn−1, ·) · λ < 0,
and thus, ε = −βn→n−1i /(pii(θni ) · λ) > 0. If we add ελ to pi(θn−1i , ·), then all
the constraints for types θli with l 6= n are unaffected because pii(θli) ·λ = 0 for
all l 6= n, and for type θni only constraint (BICn→n−1i ) is changed, which holds
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with equality under the new payment rule. Because f(θn−1, ·) · (ελ) = ε > 0,
the expected revenue increases under the new payment rule.
Similarly, if (BIRni ) is satisfied with strict inequality for some i and n,
then let βni be the amount of the slackness of this constraint (BIR
n
i ). Because
Πi has a rank N , there exists λ ∈ R(I−1)N such that:
Πiλ = (β
1
i , . . . , β
N
i )
ᵀ ≥ 0.
Adding λ to each pi(θ
n
i , ·) does not affect any (BIC) constraint, while all
the participation constraints are satisfied with equality in the new mecha-
nism. The change in the total expected revenue is:
N∑
n=1
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
f(θni , θ−i)λ(θ−i) =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
λ(θ−i)
N∑
n=1
f(θni , θ−i)
=
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
λ(θ−i)Gi(θ1i , θ−i)
=
1
κ1i
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
λ(θ−i)pii(θ1i )[θ−i]
=β1i ,
which is non-negative.
Next, we consider the case where f is singular, that is, for some i, Ωi
has a rank strictly less than N . Consider a sequence of distributions over
Θ, {f r}∞r=1, such that each f r is full-support and fr → f (in the standard
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Euclidean distance).16 By Assumption 1, without loss of generality, we as-
sume that the monotonicity constraints (M) are not binding in the problem
of REPfr .
We prove the following continuity lemma.
Lemma 4. For each ε > 0, there exists rε ∈ N such that, for any r ≥ rε,
REPfr ≤ REPf + ε and V (fr) ≥ V (f)− ε.
Proof. (of the lemma)
For the first inequality, recall that REPf =
∑
i
∑
θ max{γi(θ), 0}f(θ),
which is obviously continuous in f .
For the second inequality, let (q, p) be a solution to the problem of V (f).
In the following, for each r, we construct another mechanism (q, pr) (note
that we keep the same q), so that it satisfies all the constraints of the problem
of V (fr), namely:
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
piri (θ
n
i )[θ−i]
(
vi(qi(θ
n
i , θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i)− pri (θni , θ−i)
) ≥ 0, (BIRni (r))
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
piri (θ
n
i )[θ−i]
(
vi(qi(θ
n
i , θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i)− pri (θni , θ−i)
)
≥
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
piri (θ
n
i )[θ−i]
(
vi(qi(θ
l
i, θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i)− pri (θli, θ−i)
)
. (BICn→li (r))
16We can always find such a sequence because the set of all non-singular distributions
is a dense subset of the set of all distributions over Θ.
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Let:
Sni (r) = max
0, ∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
piri (θ
n
i )[θ−i]
(
pi(θ
n
i , θ−i)− vi(qi(θni , θ−i), θni , θ−i)
) ,
denote the size of violation of (BIRni (r)) by p. If we consider a modified
payment rule p′ so that p′i(θ
n
i , ·) = pi(θni , ·)− Sni (r)1, then this new payment
rule satisfies the participation constraints, but may not satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraints. Thus, let:
Ln→li (r) = max
{
0,
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
piri (θ
n
i )[θ−i]
(
vi(qi(θ
l
i, θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i)− p′i(θli, θ−i)
)
−
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
piri (θ
n
i )[θ−i]
(
vi(qi(θ
n
i , θ−i), θ
n
i , θ−i)− p′i(θni , θ−i)
)}
,
denote the size of violation of (BICn→li (r)) by p
′. As in the first part of
the proof, the matrix of agent i’s belief in the simple type space T̂ fr , Πri =(
piri (θ
1
i ), . . . , pi
r
i (θ
N
i )
)ᵀ
, has a rankN , and hence, there exists λ1i (r), . . . , λ
N
i (r) ∈
R(I−1)N such that:
Πri
(
λ1i (r), . . . , λ
N
i (r)
)
=
(
Ln→li (r)
)
N×N ,
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which we denote by Lr. Or equivalently:
Lr =

κ1i (r) · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · κNi (r)

N×N︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Kr

1 · · · 1
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 1

N×N︸ ︷︷ ︸
,A
Ωr
(
λ1i (r), . . . , λ
N
i (r)
)
.
Define pri (θ
n
i , ·) = pi(θni , ·) − Sni (r)1 + λni (r). Then, together with q, it
satisfies all the constraints of the problem of V (fr).
We complete the proof by showing that
∑
θ
∑
i(p
r
i (θ) − pi(θ))fr(θ) → 0
as r →∞. Because it is obvious that Sni (r)→ 0, it suffices to show that:
N∑
n=1
fr(θ
n
i , ·) · λni (r)→ 0.
Indeed:
N∑
n=1
fr(θ
n
i , ·) · λni (r) = tr
(
A−1K−1r Lr
)→ 0,
as r →∞, because Lr → 0.
Finally, contrarily to the original claim, suppose that V (f) > REPf , and
let ε ∈ (0, V (f)−R
EP
f
2
). Then, there exists rε such that:
V (fr)−REPfr ≥ V (f)−REPf − 2ε > 0,
which contradicts the first part of this proof.
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B Proof of Theorem 2
The previous theorem already states that EPIC mechanisms have the foun-
dation if we do not have ordinal interdependence. Therefore, we only prove
its converse in this proof.
We first observe an implication of ordinal interdependence under Assump-
tions 3.
Lemma 5. Under Assumptions 3, ordinal interdependence implies at least
one of the following: (i) there exists i, qi, q
′
i, θ−i and θ
′
−i such that θ
∗
i (qi, θ−i) /∈
Θ∗i (q
′
i, θ
′
−i) and θ
∗
i (q
′
i, θ
′
−i) /∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i); or (ii) there exists i, θi, qi, q′i, θ−i and
θ′−i such that θi ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) \Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i) and θ∗i (qi, θ−i) ∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′−i).
Proof. By definition of ordinal interdependence, there exists i, θ˜−i and θ˜′−i
such that ≺θ˜−ii 6=≺
θ˜′−i
i . Single-crossing condition implies that, for any qi > 0,
any θ−i, and any distinct pair θi 6= θ′i, we have vi(qi, θ′i, θ−i) < vi(qi, θi, θ−i) if
and only if θ′i ≺θ−ii θi. Thus, there exists θi and θ′i such that vi(qi, θ′i, θ˜−i) <
vi(qi, θi, θ˜−i) and vi(qi, θ′i, θ˜
′
−i) > vi(qi, θi, θ˜
′
−i) hold for any qi > 0. Fixed any
qi > 0, by Assumption 3, there exists θ−i and θ′−i such that θi ∈ Θ
∗
i (qi, θ−i), θ
′
i /∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i);
θi /∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ′−i), θ′i ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ′−i).
Next, we show that if (i) is violated, then we must have (ii). Without loss of
generality, we can assume that θ∗i (qi, θ−i) ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ′−i). Since θi ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i)
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and θi /∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ′−i), we have θi ∈ Θ∗i (qi, θ−i) \ Θ∗i (qi, θ′−i), which means (ii)
holds. Therefore, we must have either (i) or (ii) is satisfied.
We show that, for each of these cases, there exists a mechanism that
yields a strictly higher expected revenue than the optimal EPIC mechanism.
Case (i): θ∗1(q1, θ−1) /∈ Θ∗1(q′1, θ′−1) and θ∗1(q′1, θ′−1) /∈ Θ∗1(q1, θ−1).
Consider a new mechanism (M, q∗, p∗) such that M1 = Θ1 × [0, 1], Mj =
Θj for j 6= 1, and for each ((θ˜1, x), θ˜−1) ∈M ,
q∗((θ˜1, x), θ˜−1) = qEP (θ˜),
p∗j((θ˜1, x), θ˜−1) = p
EP
j (θ˜), ∀j 6= 1,
and for p∗1, we set p
∗
1((θ˜1, x), θ˜−1) = p
EP
1 (θ˜) unless θ˜1 ∈ Θ∗1(q1, θ−1)∩Θ∗1(q′1, θ′−1)
and θ˜−1 ∈ {θ−1, θ′−1}; and for each θ˜1 ∈ Θ∗1(q1, θ−1) ∩Θ∗1(q′1, θ′−1), we set
p∗1((θ˜1, x), θ−1) = p
EP
1 (θ˜1, θ−1) + η(1− x),
p∗1((θ˜1, x), θ
′
−1) = p
EP
1 (θ˜1, θ
′
−1) + ηψ(x),
where ψ(x) = 1−√1− x2.
Intuitively, x ∈ [0, 1] is related to agent 1’s first-order belief over θ−i
and θ′−i (more precisely, their likelihood ratio). Indeed, if agent 1 reports
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his payoff type θ1 truthfully, his optimal choice of x is given by x
∗(β, β′) =√
(β/β′)2
1+(β/β′)2 , where β is 1’s first-order belief for θ−1 and β
′ is 1’s first-order
belief for θ′−1. Note that, given any µ ∈ M˚, agent 1 chooses x ∈ (0, 1) with
probability one.
It is then obvious that, if the agents report their payoff types truthfully
(and agent 1 chooses x optimally), then this new mechanism yields a strictly
higher expected revenue than the optimal EPIC mechanism.
For any agent j 6= 1, the new mechanism is outcome-equivalent to the
optimal EPIC mechanism, and hence satisfies EPIC and EPIR.
We show the incentive compatibility of agent 1 with θ˜1 ∈ Θ∗1(q1, θ−1) ∩
Θ∗1(q
′
1, θ
′
−1) (for the other payoff types, the new mechanism is outcome-
equivalent to the optimal EPIC mechanism, and hence satisfies EPIC and
EPIR). First, obviously, any deviation to θˆ1 ∈ Θ∗1(q1, θ−1) ∩ Θ∗1(q′1, θ′−1) is
not profitable. Second, any deviation to θˆ1 ∈ Θ∗1(q1, θ−1) \ Θ∗1(q′1, θ′−1) is not
profitable either, because, letting β and β′ be his first-order beliefs for θ−1
and θ′−1 respectively, the expected gain by deviation is at most
β[η(1− x∗(β, β′))] + β′[−η + ηψ(x∗(β, β′))] ≤ 0.
Similarly, we can show that any deviation to θˆ1 ∈ Θ∗1(q′1, θ′−1) \ Θ∗1(q1, θ−1)
and θˆ1 /∈ Θ∗1(q′1, θ′−1) ∪Θ∗1(q1, θ−1) is not profitable either.
Case (ii): Θ∗1(q1, θ−1) \Θ∗1(q′1, θ′−1) 6= ∅ and θ∗1(q1, θ−1) ∈ Θ∗1(q′1, θ′−1).
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Consider a new mechanism (M, q∗, p∗) such that M1 = Θ1 × [0, 1], Mj =
Θj for j 6= 1, and for each ((θ˜1, x), θ˜−1) ∈M ,
q∗((θ˜1, x), θ˜−1) = qEP (θ˜),
p∗j((θ˜1, x), θ˜−1) = p
EP
j (θ˜), ∀j 6= 1,
and for p∗1, we set p
∗
1((θ˜1, x), θ˜−1) = p
EP
1 (θ˜) unless θ˜1 ∈ Θ∗1(q1, θ−1)\Θ∗1(q′1, θ′−1)
and θ˜−1 ∈ {θ−i, θ′−i}; and for each θ˜1 ∈ Θ∗1(q1, θ−1) \Θ∗1(q′1, θ′−1), we set
p∗1((θ˜1, x), θ−1) = p
EP
1 (θ˜1, θ−1) + η(1− x),
p∗1((θ˜1, x), θ
′
−1) = p
EP
1 (θ˜1, θ
′
−1) + ηψ(x),
where ψ(x) = 1−√1− x2.
Again, x ∈ [0, 1] is related to agent 1’s first-order belief over θ−i and θ′−i.
Indeed, if agent 1 reports his payoff type θ1 truthfully, his optimal choice of
x is given by x∗(β, β′) =
√
(β/β′)2
1+(β/β′)2 , where β is 1’s first-order belief for θ−1
and β′ is 1’s first-order belief for θ′−1. Note that, given any µ ∈ M˚, agent 1
chooses x ∈ (0, 1) with probability one.
It is obvious that, if the agents report their payoff types truthfully (and
agent 1 chooses x optimally), then this new mechanism yields a strictly higher
expected revenue than the optimal EPIC mechanism.
For any agent j 6= 1, the new mechanism is outcome-equivalent to the
optimal EPIC mechanism, and hence satisfies EPIC and EPIR.
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We show the incentive compatibility of agent 1 with θ˜1 ∈ Θ∗1(q1, θ−1) \
Θ∗1(q
′
1, θ
′
−1) (for the other payoff types, the new mechanism is outcome-
equivalent to the optimal EPIC mechanism, and hence satisfies EPIC and
EPIR). First, obviously, any deviation to θˆ1 ∈ Θ∗1(q1, θ−1) \ Θ∗1(q′1, θ′−1) is
not profitable. Second, any deviation to θˆ1 ∈ Θ∗1(q1, θ−1) ∩Θ∗1(q′1, θ′−1) is not
profitable either, because, letting β and β′ be his first-order beliefs for θ−1
and θ′−1 respectively, the expected gain by deviation is at most
β[η(1− x∗(β, β′))] + β′[−η + ηψ(x∗(β, β′))] ≤ 0.
Similarly, we can show that any deviation to θˆ1 ∈ Θ∗1(q′1, θ′−1) \ Θ∗1(q1, θ−1)
and θˆ1 /∈ Θ∗1(q′1, θ′−1) ∪Θ∗1(q1, θ−1) is not profitable either.
In conclusion, EPIC mechanisms do not have the strong foundation.
C Proof of Proposition 1
Assume that (i, θi, θj, qj, θ˜−ij) satisfies the definition of strong improvability.
We use the same mechanism as above, except that the allocation for agent
i changes in case he reports θi and x = 1. Recall that, given his truthfully
reporting θi, agent 1’s optimal choice of x is
√
(β/β′)2
1+(β/β′)2 where β, β
′ are his
first-order beliefs for θ−i, θ′−i, respectively, with θ−i = (θj, θ˜−ij) and θ
′
−i =
(θ∗j (qj, θi, θ˜−ij), θ˜−ij); x = 1 means that he predicts that j does not have a
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threshold type for qj given θ˜−ij. The allocations from agents i and j are then
modified as follows (and all the other parts of the mechanism are the same
as before):
q∗∗j ((θi, 1), θ
∗
j (qj, θi, θ˜−ij), θ˜−ij) = q
∗
j ((θi, 1), θˆj, θ˜−ij),
p∗∗j ((θi, 1), θ
∗
j (qj, θi, θ˜−ij), θ˜−ij) = p
∗
j((θi, 1), θˆj, θ˜−ij),
p∗∗j ((θi, 1), θj, θ˜−ij) = p
∗
j(θi, θj, θ˜−ij) + η, ∀θj θi,θ˜−ijj θ∗j (qj, θi, θ˜−ij)
p∗∗i ((θi, 1), θ
∗
j (qj, θi, θ˜−ij), θ˜−ij) = M,
where θˆj is j’s payoff type that is just below θ
∗
j (qj, θi, θ˜−ij) with respect to
≺θi,θ˜−ijj , and M > 0 is sufficiently large.
Observe that the modified mechanism satisfies all the constraints. First,
except for agents i and j, the allocations are the same as in the previous
mechanism. For agent i, large fine M is irrelevant unless he assigns zero
probability for θ−i (because x = 1 is not optimal for him); on the other hand,
if he assigns zero probability for θ−i, then this large fine is payoff-irrelevant for
him. Finally, for agent j, we only need to check his incentive if i reports (θi, 1)
and −ij report θ˜ij: in such a case, j with payoff type θ˜j -θi,θ˜−iji θ∗j (qj, θi, θ˜−ij)
has no incentive of misreporting, because their on-path payoffs would be the
same as in the original mechanism, while the other types’ payments are higher
than in the original mechanism. For θ˜j θi,θ˜−iji θ∗j (qj, θi, θ˜−ij), his payoff by
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deviation is at most
vj(q
∗
j ((θi, 1), θˆj, θ˜−ij), θi, θ˜j, θ˜−ij)− p∗j((θi, 1), θˆj, θ˜−ij)
≤ vj(q∗j ((θi, 1), θ˜j, θ˜−ij), θi, θ˜j, θ˜−ij)− p∗j((θi, 1), θ˜j, θ˜−ij)− η,
but the right-hand side is precisely his on-path payoff. The individual ratio-
nality constraints can be checked similarly.
Finally, we show that this modified mechanism achieves a strictly higher
expected revenue than the original mechanism. First, observe that it does
not yield a lower payoff given any payoff-type profile. It is obvious except
when a payoff type (θi, θ
∗
j (qj, θi, θ˜−ij), θ˜−ij) and agent i chooses x = 1; if this
is the realized payoff-type profile, and agent i reports x = 1, agent i pays a
large fine M . Therefore, the principal would be better off by setting M large
enough.
Moreover, consider a payoff-type profile (θi, θ˜j, θ˜−ij) such that θ˜j θi,θ˜−iji
θ∗j (qj, θi, θ˜−ij). If agent i chooses x < 1 (at least with a positive probability),
then i pays η(1− x)(> 0) more than in the original mechanism, and hence,
strict improvement is achieved. If agent i chooses x = 1 (with probability
one), then the principal increases j’s payment by η as explained above, and
thus, again strict improvement is achieved.
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D Proof of Theorem 3
It suffices to show that ordinal interdependence implies strong improvability.
By ordinal interdependence, there exist i, θ−i, θ′−i such that ≺θ−ii 6=≺
θ′−i
i .
We first observe the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Ordinal interdependence implies that there exist j 6= i, θj, θ′j,
and θ˜−ij such that ≺θj ,θ˜−iji 6=≺
θ′j ,θ˜−ij
i .
Proof. Let i = 1 without loss of generality, and for each n = 1, . . . , I, let
θn−1 = ((θ
′
j)
n
j=2, (θj)
I
j=n+1). Note that θ
1
−1 = θ−1 and θ
I
−1 = θ
′
−1.
If ≺θ
n−1
−1
1 =≺θ
n
−1
1 for all n = 2, . . . , I, then we have θ
1
−1 = θ
I
−1, contra-
dicting that ≺θ−11 6=≺θ
′
−1
1 . Therefore, there exists n ∈ {2, . . . , I} such that
≺θ
n−1
−1
1 6=≺θ
n
−1
1 . We complete the proof of the lemma by setting j = n and
θ˜−1j = ((θ′k)
n−1
k=2 , (θk)
I
k=n+1).
By the lemma, there exists θi, θ
′
i such that θi (θj ,θ˜−ij)i θ′i and θ′i 
(θ′j ,θ˜−ij)
i
θi. Letting qi = q
EP
i (θ
′
i, θj, θ˜−ij) and q
′
i = q
EP
i (θ
′
i, θ
′
j, θ˜−ij), by Assump-
tion 4, we have θ′i = θ
∗
i (q
′
i, θ
′
j, θ˜−ij) = θ
∗
i (qi, θj, θ˜−ij). It follows that θi ∈
Θ∗i (qi, θi, θ˜−ij) \ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′j, θ˜−ij) and θ∗i (qi, θj, θ˜−ij) ∈ Θ∗i (q′i, θ′j, θ˜−ij). Then,
revenue from agent i is improvable with respect to
(
θi, (θj, θ˜−ij), (θ′j, θ˜−ij)
)
.
Without loss of generality, we assume that θ′j ≺θi,θ˜−ijj θj. Letting qj =
qEPj (θ
′
j, θi, θ˜−ij), by Assumption 4, we have θ
′
j = θ
∗
j (qj, θi, θ˜−ij) and θj ∈
Θ∗j(qj, θi, θ˜−ij)\{θ∗j (qj, θi, θ˜−ij)}. Thus, revenue from i is improvable with re-
spect to
(
θi, (θj, θ˜−ij), (θ∗j (qj, θi, θ˜−ij), θ˜−ij)
)
, where θj ∈ Θ∗j(qj, θi, θ˜−ij), which
establishes the strong improvability.
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